Stella and Peter Sue Their Brother William to Quiet Title to Brooklyn Property.

Court Determines Whether (or Not) William Raised Issue of Fact on Adverse Possession Claim

Stella Vassilakos and her brother, Peter, commenced an action against their brother, William Vassilakos, seeking a judgment declaring that they were tenants in common with a cumulative 40% interest in property located in Brooklyn, to quiet title to the property, and for the partition of the property. William interposed an answer and asserted various affirmative defenses and counterclaims, including that he had acquired sole title to the property by adverse possession. Stella moved for summary judgment on the complaint and dismissing William’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Supreme Court denied the motion. Stella appealed.

To obtain summary judgment in an action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL article 15, the movant must establish, prima facie, that it holds title, or that the nonmovant’s title claim is without merit. Here, Stella established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that Stella and the others each acquired an interest in the property as tenants in common upon the death of their father intestate in 1988, and thereafter, they each acquired an additional interest in the property as tenants in common upon the death of their mother intestate in 2004.

In opposition, William raised a triable issue of fact as to his ownership interests with evidence that he acquired sole title to the property by adverse possession. To establish a claim of adverse possession, the occupation of the property must be (1) hostile and under a claim of right (i.e., a reasonable basis for the belief that the subject property belongs to a particular party), (2) actual, (3) open and notorious, (4) exclusive, and (5) continuous for the statutory period (at least 10 years). However, where, as here, the party claiming adverse possession is a tenant-in-common in exclusive possession, the statutory period required by RPAPL 541 is 20 years of continuous exclusive possession before a cotenant may acquire full title by adverse possession.

Here, William’s opposition included evidence that he had exclusively maintained and controlled the property since 1988; Stella Vassilakos believed him to be the sole owner of the property; and Peter collected rental checks for the property that were deposited in Williams’ name alone. That evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether William acquired sole title to the property by adverse possession.

Accordingly, Supreme Court properly denied Stella and Peter’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint and dismissing William’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims.

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